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Abstract. Moving data to the cloud represents today a growing trend
as it provides considerable advantages, both in terms of economy of scale
and ﬂexibility/elasticity for data owners. In such a scenario, there is how-
ever a clear need for solutions aimed at protecting the conﬁdentiality of
(sensitive) data and accesses. In this chapter, we illustrate some solu-
tions proposed in the literature for protecting access conﬁdentiality and
classify them, depending on the underlying data structure used for data
storage and support for access operations, in two classes: (i) ORAM-
based approaches, and (ii) dynamically allocated data structures.
1 Introduction
The increasingly growing adoption of cloud technologies demands for solutions
able to guarantee an eﬃcient and secure use of outsourced storage services. The
beneﬁts brought by such services range from improved scalability and accessi-
bility of data to decreased management costs, providing a ﬂexible alternative
to expensive, locally-implemented solutions. However, moving possibly sensitive
data to the cloud exposes them to new privacy threats, arising speciﬁcally from
the fact that they are kept out of the data owner’s premises [5,23]. Indeed, the
cloud provider storing the data is trusted to properly provide its service (e.g.,
to store data and protect them against outside attacks). However, it is not fully
trusted to access the plaintext content of the (possibly sensitive) data it stores.
Encryption techniques are a necessary component to ensure the conﬁden-
tiality of data managed by a cloud provider. The adoption of encryption at the
client side guarantees that only (authorized) users, who legitimately know (or
can compute) the encryption keys used to protect conﬁdential data, are able
to access the plaintext data content. Although encryption provides protection
guarantee of conﬁdentiality of data at rest, it falls short in scenarios where data
stored at an external cloud provider are accessed (read and/or written). Indeed,
observing accesses to an outsourced data collection may reveal sensitive infor-
mation about the user performing the search operation as well as about the
data collection itself [15,16,18]. Consider, as an example, a publicly available
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medical database. Disclosing the fact that Alice is looking for the treatments
for a rare disease reveals to an observer the fact that she (or a person close to
her) suﬀers from such a disease, with a clear privacy violation. Similarly, dis-
closing the fact that two accesses aim at the same target encrypted data item
permits an observer to keep track of the frequency of accesses to data items and,
exploiting external knowledge on the frequency of accesses to the corresponding
plaintext data, reveals her the sensitive content of the outsourced dataset. Dif-
ferent techniques have then been proposed to protect both access conﬁdentiality
(i.e., conﬁdentiality of the target of each access request) and pattern conﬁden-
tiality (i.e., conﬁdentiality of the fact that two accesses aim at the same target).
The ﬁrst line of works that addressed this problem is based on Private Infor-
mation Retrieval (PIR, e.g., [20]). However, PIR-based approaches implicitly
assume that the accessed data collection is not sensitive, and that only access
operations need to be protected. Also, these solutions suﬀer from high computa-
tional costs that limit their applicability in real world scenarios. In this chapter,
we will speciﬁcally focus on two recent classes of approaches aimed at protect-
ing data, access, and pattern conﬁdentiality while reducing computational cost
with respect to PIR-based solutions. The ﬁrst class is based on the adoption of
ORAM (Oblivious Random Access Memory) data structure, which is a layered
structure that supports equality search operations while hiding the target of the
access to the eyes of the storage server. ORAM-based solutions are based on the
idea that data are re-allocated to the top level of the layered structure after each
access. These solutions, although eﬀective, suﬀer from the fact that ORAM data
structure does not preserve the natural ordering among data items. Hence, as
an example, it does not support range searches. The second class of solutions
overcomes this drawback by adopting dynamically allocated data structures for
protecting access conﬁdentiality. These solutions organize data in well known
data structures traditionally used to support eﬃcient access to the data (e.g.,
B+-trees) and change the allocation of accessed data to memory slots at each
access, to prevent an observer from identifying repeated accesses by observing
read and write operations at the memory level.
In the remainder of this chapter, we ﬁrst illustrate some approaches based
on the adoption of Oblivious RAM structure (Sect. 2), and then describe two
dynamically allocated data structures (Sect. 3). Finally, we present our conclu-
sions (Sect. 4).
2 Oblivious RAM Data Structures
One of the most widely known class of approaches adopted to protect access
and pattern conﬁdentiality is based on the adoption of ORAM (Oblivious RAM)
data structures.
ORAM has ﬁrst been proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky in [13,14,19] to
the aim of concealing the memory access patterns of a software program running
on a microprocessor, to safeguard the software from illegitimate duplication and
consequent redistribution. To this purpose, ORAM acts as an interface between
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the microprocessor and the memory subsystem, in such a way to make mem-
ory access patterns indistinguishable. During a program execution, the ORAM
interface makes the probability distribution of a sequence of memory addresses
independent from the input values of the program and dependent only from the
length of the program. Any ORAM requires Ω(logN) bandwidth overhead to
conceal an access pattern from a storage space including N items [13,14,19].
Also, the best ORAM implementation [14] requires O(N logN) server storage
and implies an amortized communication overhead of O(log3 N) (O(N log2 N),
resp.) in the average case (worst case, resp.).
ORAM structure has recently been adopted for the deﬁnition of approaches
aimed at protecting the conﬁdentiality of accesses to data stored at a remote
server. In fact, the problem of protecting memory access patterns generated by
a software program is very similar to the problem of privately retrieving data
from a remote storage server. Indeed, even if from a practical perspective the two
problems present some diﬀerences (e.g., diﬀerent costs of read and write oper-
ations, storage capacity on the client side, latency of network communications
compared with the one between a microprocessor and its memory subsystem),
from a theoretical point of view the two problems can be modeled in the same
way as both aim at protecting the conﬁdentiality of access operations to the
eyes of the party in charge of its execution (i.e., the processor and the stor-
age server, respectively). Considering a simpliﬁed scenario characterized by one
client and one storage server, client’s data are individually encrypted using an
encryption key known only to the client, and the resulting blocks are stored in a
ORAM-based structure at the server side. Intuitively, ORAM-based structures
conceal from the storage server the exact memory location where the block con-
taining the target data item is stored by retrieving more than one block at a
time (i.e., the target block and some additional blocks). The client then changes
the allocation of data items to memory locations and writes re-encrypted blocks
back at the server, according to the new allocation strategy. The strategy used
for the traversal of the data structure makes the accesses to diﬀerent data items
indistinguishable. In particular, repeated accesses become indistinguishable from
accesses to diﬀerent target data items.
In the remainder of this section, we will ﬁrst describe the original hierarchical
ORAM structure [14], and then illustrate more recent variations over the original
architecture, Path ORAM [22] and Ring ORAM [21], aimed at reducing its
computational overhead.
2.1 Hierarchical ORAM
Consider a set of N data items, uniquely identiﬁed through an identiﬁer id∈ID,
that should be stored in a hierarchical ORAM [13,14,19] structure. Each data
item is individually encrypted, using a semantically-secure cipher and a key
known only to the client, before being stored in the ORAM structure. This
guarantees that no information about the plaintext content of the data item can
be leaked from its encrypted representation. In the following, we illustrate the
structure of hierarchical ORAM, and the working of access operations.
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Structure. Hierarchical ORAM is a pyramid-shaped data structure composed
of logN levels, which can be used to store client’s data items. Each level l in
the ORAM structure includes 2l buckets, with a storage capacity of klogN
slots each, k ≥ 1. Each slot in a bucket can store either an encrypted data item
(real block) or an encrypted dummy/empty item (dummy block). Thanks to
the adoption of a semantically secure cipher, real blocks and dummy blocks are
indistinguishable to the eyes of the storing server.
Each level l except the ﬁrst one (2 ≤ l ≤ logN) in the ORAM structure
has a hash function hl : ID → {1, . . . , 2l} that associates the identiﬁer of a
data item, id∈ID, with the unique position of the bucket on level l where the
data item might be stored. Figure 1(a) illustrates a 3-level hierarchical ORAM
structure, where each bucket stores up to 4 blocks. In the ﬁgure, we report on
the top of each bucket its position in the level; real blocks are gray and dummy
blocks are white.
At initialization time, the N real blocks obtained encrypting client’s data
items are stored in the last and largest level (i.e., l = logN) of the ORAM
structure. Hence, each real block is stored in the slot identiﬁed by the hash
function associated with the last level in the structure. All the other blocks in
the last level, as well as any block in all the other levels of the ORAM structure,
are ﬁlled with dummy blocks.
Read Access. Access operations to data stored in a hierarchical ORAM struc-
ture require to maintain two invariants to protect access and pattern conﬁden-
tiality: (i) access operations do not reveal to the server the level where the target
block is stored (guaranteed by always accessing one bucket at each level of the
ORAM structure); and (ii) access operations never retrieve a block in the same
bucket more than once (even when repeating access to the same data item).
Let us consider an access request for the data item identiﬁed by id. The
client starts visiting the ORAM structure from its top level and retrieves, for
each level l, the bucket where the target data item could be stored at level l.
To this purpose, the client computes hl(id), l = 2, . . . , logN. Note that the
client always retrieves both the buckets on the top level (i.e., l = 1) of the
ORAM structure, which does not have any hash function. To prevent leaking
to the storage server the level where the target data item is stored, the client
always ends her visit of the ORAM structure at the bottom level l = logN
of the structure. In fact, stopping the access process at a diﬀerent level would
inevitably reveal to the storage server that the target data item was stored at
the last accessed level. Consider, as an example, the search for value C over the
hierarchical ORAM in Fig. 1(a). The clients iteratively downloads the buckets
denoted with a bold blue fence in the ﬁgure. The client ﬁrst downloads the two
buckets at level l = 1. Then, it computes h2(C) = 4 and downloads the 4th
bucket at level 2. Even if C belongs to the downloaded bucket at level 2, the
client computes h3(C) = 7 and downloads the 7th bucket at level 3.
The client decrypts each bucket downloaded from the server and locally stores
its plaintext representation. Once the client has completed her visit of the ORAM
structure (i.e., she has downloaded the bucket at level l = logN), she moves




Fig. 1. An example of an access searching for C in a hierarchical ORAM structure
(a, b) and of reconstruction of the ﬁrst level of the ORAM structure (c) (Color ﬁgure
online)
the target data item in one of the two buckets at level l = 1. The client then
removes the target block from the bucket where it was stored before the access,
substitutes it with a fresh dummy block, re-encrypts the target data item, and
inserts the resulting encrypted block in one of the two buckets at level l = 1.
Since the top level is not associated with any hash function, the choice of the
bucket where to insert the target block depends on the sequence number of the
current access request (odd or even). The client then re-encrypts all the accessed
blocks and writes the downloaded buckets back at the server, following the same
order as read accesses (i.e., starting from the top of the structure). Considering
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the search for C in the ORAM structure in Fig. 1(a), the client moves the block
storing C to one of the two buckets at level 1 (the second one in the example)
and re-encrypts all the accessed blocks. The client then rewrites, in the order, the
accessed buckets at the server starting from the top of the structure. Figure 1(b)
illustrates the status of the ORAM structure after the access searching for C.
Even if each bucket in the ORAM structure stores up to klogN, after
2klogN access operations the two buckets at level 1 will be full. Hence, to
guarantee that the second invariant is satisﬁed (i.e., no block is retrieved more
than once in the same bucket), it is necessary to reconstruct the ﬁrst level of
the ORAM structure. To this aim, the blocks in the ﬁrst level are obliviously
transferred to the second level. To obliviously transfer blocks, the client changes
the hash function h2 of the second level of the ORAM structure and reorganizes
all the (real) blocks that were stored in the buckets on level 1 and on level 2,
accordingly. Clearly, this implies downloading, decrypting, re-encrypting, and
rewriting back at the server all the buckets at level 1 and at level 2. In general,
after 2l access operations, some buckets at level l (1 ≤ l ≤ logN) will be full
and it will be necessary to obliviously transfer all the data blocks at level l to
level l + 1, changing the hash function at level l + 1 and applying a O(N logN)
oblivious sorting algorithm. Note that after 2log NklogN accesses it is neces-
sary to change the hash function of the bottom level of the ORAM structure,
which implies downloading, decrypting, re-encrypting, and rewriting back at the
server the whole data collection. For instance, assuming that the ﬁrst level in the
ORAM structure in Fig. 1(b) needs to be reconstructed, the client moves data
items N , C, and F to the second level and re-deﬁnes h2. As visible in Fig. 1(c),
this implies re-writing both the buckets at level 1 and the buckets at level 2,
since all the data items in these two levels can be allocated at any of the buckets
in level 2. Indeed, in the considered example, Y moves from the 1st to the 3rd
bucket.
Write Access. Since every read access operation by the client implies re-writing
all the accessed buckets, client operations consisting of access requests to read,
write, insert, or delete a block are indistinguishable from the point of view of the
storing server. Indeed, they all present the same access pattern, thanks to the
adoption of an encryption function that obfuscates whether the item inserted in
the top level before rewriting buckets back at the server contains an actual data
item already stored in the ORAM structure, a new data item, or a dummy item.
2.2 Path ORAM
Building on the original hierarchical ORAM structure, a considerable research
eﬀort has been spent to make ORAM schemes more practical and eﬃcient. Path
ORAM [22] is a recent ORAM-based approach that does not require expensive
periodic level reconstruction.
Structure. Path ORAM is a binary tree with height h = log N and N
leaves, where N is the number of data items in the data collection. Each node
in the Path ORAM structure is a bucket that can store up to Z ≥ 1 (real
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or dummy) blocks each. Each data item is associated with a leaf in the Path
ORAM structure, uniquely identifying a set of buckets (those along the path
to the leaf node) where the data item can be stored. The client keeps track of
data-leaf association by locally storing a position map, which is a set of pairs of
the form 〈id, pos〉, where id is the identiﬁer of a data item and pos is the position
identifying the corresponding leaf in the tree. The size of the position map is
O(N logN/B), where B is the node size.
Besides the position map, the client also locally stores a portion of the data
collection in a local stash having size O(logN). The local stash is necessary to
properly manage access operations, as illustrated in the following, by guarantee-
ing that each data item is always stored either in a bucket along the path as per
the position map or in the local stash. Figure 2(a) illustrates, on the right an
example of a Path ORAM structure with 8 leaves and height equal to 3, where
each bucket stores up to Z = 4 blocks. In the ﬁgure, node identiﬁers are reported
on top of nodes, real blocks are gray, while dummy blocks are white. The ﬁgure
also illustrates, on the left, the local stash and the position map stored at the
client.
Read Access. To retrieve the data item with identiﬁer equal to id, the client
ﬁrst retrieves from the local map the position pos of the corresponding leaf node.
The client then sends a request to the storing server, and downloads the h + 1
buckets along the path from the root of the tree to the leaf node in position
pos. Indeed, if not in the local stash, the data item of interest is stored in one of
these buckets. The client decrypts the downloaded Z(h+1) blocks and inserts the
corresponding data items in the local stash. To guarantee that future searches
for the same target data item do not visit the same path, the client assigns a
new randomly chosen position (i.e., a new leaf) to the target data item and
updates the local position map accordingly. Consider, as an example, a search
for value C in the Path ORAM structure in Fig. 2(a). The client ﬁrst downloads
the buckets along the path to node 7, that is, 15, 14, 12, and 7 (see Fig. 2(b),
where accessed nodes are denoted with a bold blue fence). It decrypts the ﬁve
downloaded real blocks and inserts them into the local stash, which included
values Z and B before the access. It then randomly assigns a new position to C,
6 in the example.
The client then rewrites the downloaded blocks back at the server, after
having possibly changed their content. In particular, the client inserts into the
buckets to be rewritten back all the data items in the local stash that are asso-
ciated with a leaf whose path intersects the visited/downloaded path. In such
a bucket reorganization, the client moves data items as close as possible to leaf
nodes. To prevent the server from tracking eviction operations, all the accessed
data items are re-encrypted and, once the buckets along the visited path have
been updated, written back at the storing server. Considering the search for
value C illustrated in Fig. 2, the client inserts C into node 14, which is the deep-
est node along the common sub-paths to 7 and 6. Also, the client can evict Z
and B from the stash, inserting them into buckets 15 and 12, respectively. The
client will also push T to node 7 and R to node 14, while N and F remain in the
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Fig. 2. An example of Path ORAM structure (a) and of the path read (a) and written
(b) by an access operation searching for C (Color ﬁgure online)
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root node. The client then re-encrypts real and dummy blocks and rewrites the
updated content of buckets 15, 14, 12, and 7 at the server (see Fig. 2(c), where
written nodes are denoted with a bold blue fence). Clearly, even if any data item
in the stash could be inserted into the root node, due to capacity constraints, the
remaining data items are stored in the local stash. On the contrary, if after the
eviction from the stash a bucket along the visited path is not full, it is completed
with dummy blocks.
The size of the local stash as well as the size of buckets need to be carefully
chosen to avoid overﬂows. Indeed, as demonstrated in [22], if the size of buckets
is lower than 4 (i.e., Z < 4), buckets close to the root tend to become congested
and cause the stash to grow indeﬁnitely, with the non-negligible probability of
having a number of data items associated with a leaf node greater than the
capacity of the corresponding path. On the contrary, if the number of blocks per
bucket is greater than or equal to 4 (i.e., Z ≥ 4), a stash with size O(Z(h + 1))
guarantees a negligible probability of stash overﬂow.
Path ORAM causes 2ZlogN access overhead, O(N) server storage over-
head, and O(logN)ω(1) + O(N logN/B) client storage overhead. The storage
overhead at the client side is due to the need of locally accommodating the stash,
O(logN)ω(1), and the position map, O(N logN/B). To reduce the client storage
overhead, an alternate version of the Path ORAM design proposes to recursively
outsource the position map in a sequence of smaller Path ORAM structures [22].
This permits to reduce the client storage overhead to O(logN)ω(1), at the cost of
increasing the access overhead to O(log2 N/ logB) and the number of communi-
cation rounds per operation between the client and the server to O(logN/ logB).
2.3 Ring ORAM
A further improvement of the hierarchical ORAM structure is represented by
Ring ORAM [21], which is a recent ORAM-based approach aimed at reducing the
bandwidth overhead of Path ORAM. Indeed, Ring ORAM reduces access over-
head to O(1) and the overall bandwidth to −2.5 log(N), assuming that the stor-
age server can perform computations. We note, however, that ORAM schemes
requiring server-side computations are not compatible with basic cloud-storage
services (e.g., Amazon S3) [2].
Structure. Ring ORAM adopts the same server-side structure as Path ORAM,
with the only diﬀerence that each node in the tree is complemented with addi-
tional metadata. The metadata associated with a node include a set of S addi-
tional dummy blocks, a randomly chosen permutation map that associates the
positions of blocks in a bucket with their identiﬁers, and a counter of accesses to
the bucket. Figure 3 represents an example of a Ring ORAM structure, together
with the local stash and position map stored at the client.
Read Access. Ring ORAM adopts an approach similar to Path ORAM to
retrieve the data item with identiﬁer equal to id. The client ﬁrst retrieves from
the local map the position pos of the corresponding leaf node and downloads
from the server the metadata of the nodes along the path to pos. Note that
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Fig. 3. An example of Ring ORAM structure and the blocks downloaded by an access
operation searching for C (Color ﬁgure online)
the metadata size is much less than the node size. Based on the information in
the downloaded metadata, the client selects one block for each node along the
path to the target leaf. In particular, for each node along the path, the client
selects: the target block, if it is stored in the node; an unread dummy block,
otherwise. Indeed, by reading only metadata, the client can determine whether
the requested block is present in the bucket, identify its position using the oﬀsets
map, or choose an unread dummy block using the counter of accesses.
Since only one of the O(logN) blocks downloaded from the server is a real
block (i.e., the block of interest), Ring ORAM can guarantee O(1) online band-
width in access execution, by requiring some server-side computation. Indeed, if
dummy blocks have a ﬁxed content (e.g., di = 0), and the server computes the
xor of all encrypted blocks selected along the target path, the client can easily
retrieve the content of the only real block downloaded (i.e., the target block).
The server then computes E(x, r)⊕E(d1, r1)⊕ . . .⊕E(dn, rn) where x is the tar-
get block, di is a dummy block, and ri is a random nonce employed by the client
when encrypting the block and picked from a pseudo-random number generator
seeded with a value obtained from the position of the block in the node and the
level in the tree of the considered node. By computing E(d1, r1)⊕ . . .⊕E(dn, rn)
the client can then retrieve the target block and, by decrypting it, the target
data item. Consider, as an example, the structure in Fig. 3 and a search for value
C, which is associated with leaf 7 in the position map. The client will download
from the server the metadata along the path 15 → 14 → 12 → 7 (denoted
with a bold blue line in the ﬁgure) from the server. Assuming that, based on
the metadata, the client discovers that C is stored in bucket 12, she identiﬁes
an unread dummy block in buckets 7 (d7), 14 (d14), and 15 (d15) and asks the
server to compute E(C, r12) ⊕ E(d7, r7) ⊕ E(d14, r14) ⊕ E(d15, r15). The client
will then compute E(d7, r7)⊕E(d14, r14)⊕E(d15, r15) to retrieve the encrypted
block E(C, r12), and then extract the plaintext target data item.
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To guarantee access and pattern conﬁdentiality, Path ORAM requires that
each block in a bucket, be it dummy or real, is read at most once. If a bucket is
accessed many times, there is the possibility for dummy blocks to be exhausted.
To overcome this problem, Ring ORAM adopts an early reshuﬄe approach to
reshuﬄe a bucket after it has been accessed by S read operations.
To optimize the cost of access operations, diﬀerently from Path ORAM, Ring
ORAM does not rewrite back accessed buckets at each read operation. On the
contrary, it performs write operations periodically (once every A read accesses),
evicting as many data items from the stash as possible. Write operations are
performed in a speciﬁc (inverse lexicographic) order to minimize overlap between
consecutive write paths and hence maximize the eﬀectiveness of the eviction
strategy. Consider, as an example, a Ring ORAM structure with four leaves. As
visible from Fig. 4, writing the paths to the leaves in inverse lexicographic order
minimizes intersection between subsequent accesses. Note that in the ﬁgure, for
simplicity, we report only the identiﬁer of leaf nodes and do not represent buckets
content.
00 (inverse 00) 10 (inverse 01) 01 (inverse 10) 11 (inverse 11)
Fig. 4. Order in which paths are written in a Ring ORAM structure
3 Dynamically Allocated Data Structures
An alternative class of approaches aimed at protecting and access and pattern
conﬁdentiality is represented by dynamically allocated data structures (e.g., [1,3,
4,6–12,17]). Intuitively, these techniques are based on the idea that traditional
data structures used to eﬃciently store and retrieve data (e.g., binary search
trees, B+-trees, hash tables) can be proﬁtably used to enforce access and pattern
conﬁdentiality, by dynamically reallocating accessed data at each read operation.
This class of solutions has the advantage over ORAM-based solutions that data
are organized in the data structure according to the value of an index attribute
(or identiﬁer). Hence, they naturally oﬀer support for range queries and easily
accommodate changes in the number of data items stored in the structure. On the
contrary, the structures illustrated in Sect. 2 do not reﬂect, in their organization,
the logical order among identiﬁers. Indeed, the parent-child relationship among
Access Privacy in the Cloud 197
nodes does not depend on the value of the identiﬁers of the data items they
store. Hence, they do not oﬀer support for range queries.
In the remainder of this section, we ﬁrst describe the shuﬄe index [11], which
is a dynamically allocated data structure based on the organization of data in a
B+-tree, and a self-balancing binary tree data structure [7].
3.1 Shuﬄe Index
The shuﬄe index [8] is a dynamically allocated data structure that logically
organizes data in a B+-tree, to enable eﬃcient data retrieval while protecting
access and pattern conﬁdentiality. In the following, we illustrate the structure of
the shuﬄe index, and the working of access operations.
Structure. The shuﬄe index, at the abstract level, is an unchained B+-tree
(i.e., a B+-tree with no connection between contiguous leaves, not to reveal
to the storing server their relative order) deﬁned over a candidate key for the
set of outsourced data items. Given the fan-out F of the index structure, each
internal node of the shuﬄe index stores an ordered sequence of q − 1 values
v1 ≤ . . . ≤ vq−1, with q ≥ F/2 (but for the root, for which 1 ≤ q ≤ F ). Each
of the q children of the node is the root of a subtree storing all the values in
the range [vi,vi+1], i = 1, . . . , q − 2. The ﬁrst child of the node stores all the
values lower than v1, while the last child of the node stores all the values greater
than vq−1. Leaf nodes store, together with key values, the corresponding data
items. Figure 5(a) illustrates an example of an abstract shuﬄe index with fan-out
F = 3.
At the logical level, the shuﬄe index is a collection of nodes, each associated
with a unique randomly assigned logical identiﬁer. Hence, logical identiﬁers do
not reﬂect the natural order relationship among the values in nodes content. Log-
ical identiﬁers are used to represent pointers to children in the internal nodes of
the B+-tree structure. Consider the abstract structure in Fig. 5(a). Figure 5(b)
illustrates an example of its logical representation where, for the sake of read-
Abstract index Logical index Physical index
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. An example of abstract (a), logical (b), and physical (c) shuﬄe index
Legend:  target, • node in cache,  cover; blocks read and written: dark gray ﬁll-
ing, blocks written: light gray ﬁlling
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ability, logical node identiﬁers are reported on top of each node. The ﬁrst digit
of logical identiﬁers correspond to the level of the node in the tree.
At the physical level, the logical identiﬁer of each node translates into the
physical address where the corresponding block is stored. The block representing
a logical node is obtained by encrypting the logical node content, concatenated
with a random nonce, to destroy plaintext distinguishability. Consider the log-
ical shuﬄe index in Fig. 5(b). Figure 5(c) illustrates an example of its physical
representation, which corresponds to the view of the provider over the shuﬄe
index.
Read Access. For each access operation aimed at searching a value v of the
candidate key over which the index has been deﬁned, the shuﬄe index com-
bines the following three protection techniques for providing access and pattern
conﬁdentiality.
– Cover searches. The search for the target value is complemented with
num cover additional fake searches, not recognizable as such by the storage
server. Cover searches are chosen in such a way to visit num cover disjoint
paths, that is, paths including a disjoint set of nodes, apart from the root.
Intuitively, for each level of the shuﬄe index, the client downloads the node
along the path to the target, and num cover additional nodes along the paths
to the covers. Therefore, from the point of view of the storing server, any of
the num cover+1 downloaded nodes at each level could be the one along the
path to the target.
– Cached searches. To prevent the storing server from identifying repeated
accesses by observing that subsequent searches download the same (or a
common subset of) physical blocks, the shuﬄe index uses a client-side cache
structure. The cache is a layered structure, with a layer for each level in the
shuﬄe index, storing the nodes along the (target) paths to the num cache
most recent accesses to the shuﬄe index. If the target of an access is in cache,
an additional cover is used to guarantee that each access operation downloads
exactly the same number of nodes (i.e., num cover+1) at each level of the
shuﬄe index, apart from the root.
– Shuﬄing. Shuﬄing consists in changing the allocation of nodes to blocks
at each access. Every block downloaded from the storage server is then
decrypted, associated with a diﬀerent physical address among the accessed
ones, re-encrypted using a diﬀerent random nonce, and written back at the
server. Clearly, the parents of shuﬄed nodes are updated accordingly, to main-
tain the correctness of the underlying abstract B+-tree structure. Shuﬄing
breaks the (otherwise static) node-block association. Hence, diﬀerent searches
for the same key value will imply accesses to diﬀerent blocks and, vice versa,
accesses reading/writing for a same physical block are not necessarily due to
searches for the same key value (i.e., repeated searches).
To retrieve the data item with candidate key equal to v, the client interacts
with the server to visit the shuﬄe index. Starting from the root level, for each
level in the shuﬄe index, the client: downloads the nodes along the paths to the
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target and cover searches; decrypts their content; updates the cache structure for
the visited level; shuﬄes accessed nodes; updates the parents of shuﬄed nodes;
re-encrypts and re-writes back at the server the nodes read during the previous
iteration. Consider a search for value u3 in the shuﬄe index in Fig. 5, and assume
that the cache stores the path to t1 and that value s2 is chosen as cover. The
client ﬁrst accesses the root node, which is stored in the ﬁrst level of the local
cache, and identiﬁes the blocks at level 1 along the path to the target (block 103),
to the cover (block 102), and in cache (block 101). It then downloads blocks 102
and 103, decrypts them, and inserts node s in the second level of the cache. The
client then shuﬄes nodes 101, 102, and 103 (e.g., it assigns s to 101, t to 103, and
u to 102), updates the root node accordingly, re-encrypts its content and stores
it at the server side. The client operates in a similar manner at the second level
of the tree: it downloads the blocks along the path to the target (208) and to
the cover (205), decrypts their content and updates the cache inserting node u3.
The client then shuﬄes blocks 205, 207, and 208 (e.g., it assigns s2 to 208, t1 to
205, and u3 to 207), updates and re-encrypts nodes s, t, and u accordingly, and
re-writes them back at the server. Finally, the client re-encrypts the accessed leaf
nodes and sends the corresponding blocks to the server for storage. Figure 5(c)
illustrates the cloud provider’s view over the access in terms of blocks read and
written (dark gray) and only written (light gray). Note that the server cannot
determine which, among the accessed leaves, is the target of the search operation,
nor reconstruct shuﬄing operations.
The shuﬄe index exhibits an O(logN) non-amortized access overhead and
a number of communication rounds equal to the height of the B+-tree, with
O(1) and O(N) storage overhead at the client and at the server, respectively.
Write Access. Similarly to ORAM-based structures, also the shuﬄe index
implies a re-write, for each read access, of any accessed blocks. Hence, an update
to the data content that does not modify the value of the key attribute can
be easily accommodated during any read access operation. On the contrary, an
update of the key value (as well as the insertion or removal of data items) deserve
a special treatment if the client wants to keep the nature of the access conﬁden-
tial. While the deletion of a data item can be easily managed by marking it as
invalid, the insertion of a new data item and of the corresponding key value, or
its update may imply a change in the underlying data structure. Indeed, if the
leaf node where the data item should be inserted is full, the accommodation of
the insert operation requires a split of the node itself. To prevent the storing
server from distinguishing read from write accesses, the solution in [11] proposes
to probabilistically split nodes at every access, be it associated with a read or
a write operation. Hence, during (read and write) access operations the client
chooses whether to split each visited node, with a probability that grows with
the number of key values in the node. This approach guarantees that split oper-
ations can happen during both read and write accesses, thus limiting the ability
of the storing server to distinguish between read and write accesses.
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3.2 A Dynamic Tree-Based Data Structure
The technique for protecting access and pattern conﬁdentiality presented in [7]
aims at enhancing the shuﬄe index approach along two directions: (i) it does
not require the client to commit storage resources for accessing data; and (ii) it
supports accesses by multiple clients.
Structure. To the aim of supporting eﬃcient accesses, outsourced data are
organized in a binary search tree with maximum height h = 2 log(N), with
N the number of nodes in the tree. The nodes in the tree are buckets, each
storing a set of Z data items. The mapping function, associating each data item
with the bucket storing it, is a non-invertible and non-order preserving function,
deﬁned in such a way to guarantee a balanced distribution of the data items
among the buckets. Since the mapping function is not invertible, exposure of the
bucket index does not expose sensitive values. Also, since the mapping function
is not order preserving, the binary search tree eﬃciently supports searches over
the outsourced data collection without revealing the relative order among data.
The buckets composing the binary search tree are encrypted at the client side
before storage at the server.
Read Access. Access operations combine a traditional visit of the BST with
the following four protection techniques aimed to protect access conﬁdentiality.
– Uniform accesses. All the accesses download from the provider the same num-
ber of blocks, independently from the level where the target of the search
operation is located. The number of accessed blocks is ﬁxed to h + 2. If the
path to the target node is shorter than h + 2, the client downloads a set of
ﬁller nodes, that is, of nodes that are not along the path to the target. To
guarantee that ﬁller nodes are not recognizable as such, they are randomly
chosen among the children of already accessed nodes, and nodes (be them
along the path to the target or ﬁllers) are downloaded level by level. This
guarantees that any of the h + 2 accessed nodes could be the target of the
access. Consider, as an example, a search for value F in the binary search
tree in Fig. 6 with N = 26 and h + 2 = 10. Since the path to the target node
includes only 5 nodes (light blue background in Fig. 6(a), light gray in b/w
printout), the search is complemented with 5 ﬁller nodes (white with solid
fence in Fig. 6(b)). Note that any of the 10 downloaded nodes could be the
target of the access since nodes along the path to the target are indistinguish-
able from ﬁller nodes.
– Target bubbling. After each access, the target node is moved up (close to the
root) in the tree by properly rotating the nodes along its path. This technique
protects against repeated accesses. Indeed, if two subsequent searches look for
the same target, the second access will ﬁnd the target high in the tree and
will therefore choose a high number of ﬁller nodes. Hence, the two searches
will visit two diﬀerent sets of nodes, reducing the eﬀectiveness of intersec-
tion attacks (i.e., of attacks that exploit the common downloaded blocks in
subsequent accesses to infer the target of the searches). Target bubbling has
also the advantage of changing the topology of the binary tree structure,
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(a) target path (b) accessed nodes
(c) target bubbling (d) resulting tree
(e) speculative rotations (f) resulting tree
Fig. 6. An example of search for value F in a dynamic tree-based data structure
The visit of the path to F (a) is complemented with ﬁve ﬁller nodes (b) The nodes
along the path to F are rotated (c), moving the target to the root (d) Two additional
speculative rotations (e) are performed to reduce the height of the tree (f) (Color ﬁgure
online)
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further enhancing protection. With reference to the example in Fig. 6, the
nodes along the path to F are rotated as illustrated in Fig. 6(c), obtaining
the binary tree in Fig. 6(d), where F is the root. A search for F over this
tree could visit any subtree including 10 nodes rooted at F, thus considerably
enhancing protection guarantees.
– Speculative rotations. Each access operation, because of target bubbling, can
increase or decrease the height of the tree by one. To guarantee that the height
of the tree remains within the limit of h = 2 log(N), speculative rotations
possibly rotate accessed nodes, when it could be useful for reducing the height
of the tree. Clearly, speculative rotations do not operate on the target node (or
its ancestors) because this would possibly nullify (or mitigate the advantages
of) target bubbling. Even if speculative rotations do not represent a protection
technique per se, they provide beneﬁts as they change the tree topology (and
hence paths reaching nodes). With reference to the example in Fig. 6, the
rotations in Fig. 6(e) could reduce the height of the tree. The tree resulting
after the application of speculative rotations is illustrated in Fig. 6(f) and has
a completely diﬀerent topology than the tree in Fig. 6(a) on which the access
operated.
– Physical re-allocation. At each access, the allocation of all the accessed nodes
to physical blocks is changed. Re-allocation implies the need to decrypt and
re-encrypt all the accessed nodes, concatenated with a diﬀerent random salt
to make the re-allocation untraceable by a possible observer. Also, it requires
to update the pointers to children in the parents of re-allocated nodes. Note
that, since all the accessed nodes are in a parent-child relationship, this does
not require to download additional nodes. By changing the node-block corre-
spondence at every access, physical re-allocation prevents the provider from
determining whether two accesses visited the same node (sub-path) by observ-
ing accesses to physical blocks, and hence it prevents accumulating informa-
tion on the topology of the tree. Indeed, accesses aimed at the same node
will visit diﬀerent blocks (and vice versa). Figure 7(a) illustrates an example
of physical re-allocation of the nodes/blocks accessed by the search in Fig. 6,
illustrating the nodes content before and after re-allocation. Figure 7(b) illus-
trates the view of the provider over the blocks composing the binary search
tree, and its observations of accessed blocks (in gray).
The combined adoption of the protection techniques illustrated above, which
imply both physical re-allocation and logical restructuring of the binary search
tree, guarantees access conﬁdentiality. Indeed, it makes skewed proﬁles of access
to the plaintext data statistically indistinguishable from uniform access pro-
ﬁles [7]. The approach illustrated in this section provides access and pattern
conﬁdentiality at the cost of retrieving logN blocks, and has limited client
side storage overhead, O(1), due to the storage of the address of root node only.
Access Privacy in the Cloud 203
00 I - 00→13 00 J 25- 24
. . . . . .
04 T 25 04→19 04 X 1407 18
05 F 15 05→12 05 D 0202 21
. . . . . .
12 X - 12→04 12 F 1518 05
13 M 04 13→15 13 I -19 -
14 D 05 14→05 14 Y 1621 -
15 H 00 15→24 15 N 1923 00
. . . . . .
19 L 01 19→25 19 T 0424 07
. . . . . .
24 J 09 24→00 24 H 1314 23
25 Y 16 25→14 25 L 0112 09
00 βΥ # 01
02 γι πu 03
04 Ξψ h 05
06 +Ω ϕΨ 07
08 ρ$ pΓ 09
10 r qΔ 11
12 τw θμ 13
14 eυ αη 15
16 ζj εσ 17
18 fλ κω 19
20 Σχ ΛΘ 21
22 φϑ 23
24 νξ ς! 25
00 mμ # 01
02 γι πu 03
04 kψ ων 05
06 +Ω ϕΨ 07
08 ρ$ pΓ 09
10 r qΔ 11
12 rα :τ 13
14 Ξς ξΥ 15
16 ζj εσ 17
18 fλ ηj 19
20 Σχ ΛΘ 21
22 φϑ 23
24 θβ κυ 25
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 7. An example of physical re-allocation (a) and of view of the server before (b)
and after (c) the access in Fig. 6
4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have illustrated diﬀerent solutions for protecting access
and pattern conﬁdentiality. The approaches illustrated have been classiﬁed in
two main classes: ORAM-based techniques, and dynamically allocated data
structures. For each of these classes, we have described some representative
approaches, discussing the structure for data storage and the working of access
operations.
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